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Abstract 
 
This paper proposes a key agreement scheme after secure authentication to prevent the unauthorized access 
of the data stored in a Universal Serial Bus (USB) Mass Storage Device (MSD). Due to the system 
architecture of this proposed scheme, authorized users can store their data in a secure encrypted form after 
performing authentication. The novelty of this work is that users can retrieve the encrypted data in not only 
the current session but also across different sessions, thus reducing the required communications overhead. 
This paper then analyses the security of the proposed protocol through a formal analysis to demonstrate that 
the information has been stored securely and is also protected offering strong resilience to relevant security 
attacks. The computational and communication costs of the proposed scheme is analyzed and compared to 
related works to show that the proposed scheme has an improved tradeoff for computational cost, 
communication cost and security. 
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 I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Universal Serial Bus (USB) is a well-accepted ubiquitous serial interface. It is commonly used to connect 
peripheral devices such as keyboards, mice, cell phones, printers, scanner, Mass Storage Devices (MSD), 
etc. to a host Personal Computer (PC). The high availability, high data transfer rate and ease of connectivity 
are primary advantages of USB. However, at an application level, MSD’s suffer from significant security 
weaknesses such as (1) an unauthorized user could easily read or steal confidential information as the 
information is stored in plaintext form, and (2) an attacker could intercept all the information sent over the 
bus as the channel between device and the host computer USB port can be open to the attacker (e.g. physical, 
virus or malware). User authentication and session key agreement are designed in such a way that they can 
resolve the aforementioned difficulties.  
 
Many authors have proposed authentication schemes. In 2004, Ku and Chen [1] proposed an authentication 
scheme which was solely based on passwords, but Yoon, Ryu and Yoo [2] found that Ku and Chen’s scheme 
[1] was vulnerable to the parallel session attack and so they proposed an enhanced authentication scheme. In 
2010, Yang, Wu and Chiu [3] also proposed a password based protocol for USB MSDs. Research then 
focused on complementing passwords with user biometrics [4] to offer a further factor to the authentication 
protocol in order to provide improved security. In 2013, Lee, Chen and Wu [5] proposed a biometric based 
three-factor authentication protocol for USB MSDs. However, in 2014, He et al. [6] showed that Lee, Chen 
and Wu’s scheme [5] could not resist the password guessing attack, the Denial of Service (DoS) attack and 
the replay attack, so He et al. [6] proposed a biometrics based three-factor security protocol for USB MSDs. 
In 2015, Giri et al. [7] also proposed an authentication scheme for USB MSDs using biometrics and password 
protection, where after performing mutual authentication, a session key was established to encrypt user's 
data. 
 
This research has identified that there are two drawbacks in the previously presented schemes, (1) each time 
a user sends a request to the authentication server to decrypt a stored file the server sends the same part of 
the key. If an authorized user stores that part of the key then it is no longer needed to send a subsequent 
request to the server to obtain the same part of key at a later date. However, in security protocols for consumer 
USB MSDs it is required to authenticate each and every time a user wants to store and retrieve the file; (2) 
if an authorized user wishes to retrieve a stored encrypted file within the same login session as when the file 
was originally stored into the memory of USB device, then the user has to perform all the authentication 
steps (mainly login phase) which unfortunately increases the computational and communication costs, and 
reduces device usability. 
 
This research presents a system architecture for creating a Three-factor Security Protocol (TSP), where 
authorized users can store their files in encrypted form and not only can retrieve the original file in the current 
session but additionally in subsequent sessions after performing the authentication procedure respectively. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II presents the required mathematical concepts. Section 
III introduce the proposed scheme by describing the system architecture. Section IV presents the 
authentication scheme proposed in this work and the security of the proposed scheme is analyzed in Section 
V. Section VI presents the performance evaluation and Section VII concludes the paper. Table I shows the 
nomenclature that is used throughout the paper. 
 
 TABLE I 
NOMENCLATURE 
Term Usage 
Ui                       i-th user  
AS                      Remote authentication server 
x Secret key of authentication server AS 
pwi Password of user Ui 
Bi Biometric parameter of user Ui 
IDi Identity of user Ui 
ENCk[ ] Symmetric key encryption by a key k 
DECk[ ] Symmetric key decryption by a key k 
SKi Shared secret session key between user Ui and server AS 
αi and δi  Random numbers generated by USB device 
βi and γi Random numbers generated by server AS 
Fi Unique identity or index of a file 
Fname File name 
des(·) Difference measurement function 
d Threshold value 
r Integer, first r number of bits of a file 
n Integer, total number of bits of a file 
T Current timestamp 
ΔT Estimated time delay 
h(·) Cryptographic one-way hash function 
⊕ Bitwise xor operation 
|| Concatenation operation 
 
 
 
 
II. BACKGROUND 
 
This section defines the collision resistant cryptographic one-way hash function [7], the collision resistant 
fuzzy extractor [7], [8] and collision resistant secure encryption/decryption technique [9], [10] in order to 
analyze the security of this proposed scheme. 
 
Definition 1: A collision resistant cryptographic one-way hash function maps a binary string of an arbitrary 
length to a binary string of fixed length called the hashed value. This paper considers the cryptographic one-
way hash function as previously defined [7]. 
 
Definition 2: A collision resistant fuzzy extractor can be modeled as two procedures: 1) GEN, which takes a 
binary string as input, and generates two strings, namely, arbitrary string of length l bit and auxiliary string 
of length r-bit; 2) REP, which takes a binary string and an auxiliary string, and produces an arbitrary string. 
Furthermore, this paper also defines the same definition of collision resistant fuzzy extractor as previously 
defined [7]. 
 
Definition 3: A secret key is used to encrypt plaintext into ciphertext and the same key is used to decrypt the 
ciphertext using the symmetric key block encryption/decryption technique. This process can be symbolized 
as:  kC ENC M  and  kM DEC C , where  
*
0,1M  ,  
*
0,1C   and  0,1
n
k  , given plaintext M and 
ciphertext C being binary strings of arbitrary length, secret key k being a binary string of fixed length n and 
ENC/DEC are encryption and decryption algorithms respectfully. If )(
1
3
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adversary A to choose a key  0,1
n
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The symmetric key encryption/decryption algorithm also follows the property of collision resistance as 
described in Definition 1. If  / 23ENC DECAAdv t  is the advantage to A to choose a pair      * *', 0,1 0,1RM M    
randomly such that   'k kENC M ENC M     where 
'M M  or      ', 0,1 0,1n nRC C    such that 
  'k kDEC C DEC C      where 
'C C  for the time duration 
2
3t , it can be considered that  / 23ENC DECAAdv t  is 
the advantage computed over random choices made by A for time duration 
2
3t . Then the symmetric key 
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 / 3
ENC DEC
AAdv t  is the advantage to A for the time duration 3t , given by: 
 
      / / 1 / 23 3 3max ,ENC DEC ENC DEC ENC DECA A A AAdv t Adv t Adv t                       (3) 
 
Then the symmetric key encryption/decryption ENC/DEC is called collision resistant and secure, if 
 / 3 3
ENC DEC
AAdv t  , for any small 03  . 
  
 III. ARCHITECTURE 
 
This section presents the details of the system architecture of the proposed scheme. 
 
At first, user Ui registers with an authentication server, AS, in order to request authorized access to the USB 
MSD as shown in Fig. 1(a). AS has the responsibility to verify the legitimacy of Ui when Ui wishes to read 
or write a file to a storage device via the USB interface. Ui enters their identity, password and biometric 
parameters to verify legitimacy. Fig. 1(b) shows the communication procedure when Ui wants to store a new 
file into the USB MSD in an encrypted form or wants to decrypt an already stored encrypted file in the USB 
device. 
 
This research has considered two conditions (1) Ui can store a new file in an encrypted form after performing 
mutual authentication between Ui and AS in session Si and can decrypt the newly stored encrypted file within 
the session Si after obtaining permission from AS, (2) Ui can decrypt the stored encrypted file within a 
different session, Sj, after performing mutual authentication between Ui and AS. Moreover in this proposed 
system architecture, the authentication plays a vital role whenever the users try to store/extract a file to/from 
their USB MSD, each and every time the users need to be authenticated to AS. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. System architecture of the proposed scheme 
(a) Registration procedure (b) File encryption/decryption and authentication procedure. 
 
 
IV. PROPOSED SCHEME FROM THIS RESEARCH 
 
The proposed scheme consists of (1) registration phase, (2) authentication with file encryption and decryption 
phase in current session, (3) authentication with file decryption phase in different session and (4) password 
update phase. 
 
1) AS selects a cryptographic one-way hash function  h  . This process can be symbolized as 
   
*
: 0,1  0,1
l
h  , where l is a fixed length (128 bits) integer. 
2) AS also selects a symmetric key encryption /decryption algorithm ENC/DEC and a secret key x. AS 
then publishes  / ,ENC DEC h   as the public parameters while keeping x secret.  
 
 
 A. Registration Phase 
 
In the registration phase, Ui and AS perform the following steps to obtain authorized information from the 
USB MSD: 
1) Ui inputs their biometric parameter Bi through a suitable biometric device (e.g. fingerprint reader) to 
calculate    ,i i iGEN B   . Ui also provides their password pwi and identity IDi. Ui then computes 
 ||i i ipwr h pw    and submits ,i iID pwr  to AS. 
2) After receiving ,i iID pwr , AS computes  ||i i iA h ID x pwr   and   || ||i i iC h h ID x pwr . AS then 
stores  , ,i iA C des   in Ui’s USB MSD and delivers it to Ui securely. 
3) After getting the authorized information for the USB MSD, Ui computes  ||i i i iK h ID pw  , 
 ||i i i iG B h ID pw   and stores ,i iK G  into the USB MSD. Finally, the USB MSD contains the 
parameters  , , , ,i i i iA C des K G . 
 
B. Authentication with File Encryption and Decryption Phase in the Current Session 
 
When Ui wants to store a new file (larger than r bits) in the USB MSD in an encrypted format, the following 
steps are executed between Ui and AS: 
 
1) Ui inserts their USB MSD into the client USB port and inputs their password pwi, identity IDi and 
biometric parameter Bi. The MSD then computes  ||i i i iB G h ID pw   and then checks condition 
 ',i ides B B d . If false, the device rejects Ui; otherwise the device computes  ||i i i iK h ID pw   , 
 ,i i iREP B   and     || ||i i i i iL h ID x A h pw    . Then the device checks   || ||i i i iC h L h pw 
. If the equality fails then the device rejects Ui; otherwise the device executes the next step.  
2) The USB MSD generates random number i , and computes  ||i ii r bits ih ID
Q ENC File     , 
i i iZ L    and  || || || ||i i i i i iW h L ID F T , where r, Ti and Fi are the first r number of bits of the file, the 
current timestamp of Ui and index or identity of the file respectively. Finally, message 
1 , , , , ,i i i i i iMSG ID F Q Z W T  is sent to AS. 
3) After receiving 1MSG  at timestamp Ts, AS checks the format of IDi and condition  s iT T T   . If any 
are invalid AS rejects the message; otherwise AS computes  ' ||i iL h ID x  and 
' '
i i iL Z   . Then AS 
checks  ' '|| || || ||i i i i i iW h L ID F T . If the equality does not hold, AS rejects the message; otherwise AS 
generates random number βi and computes    '||i ii r bits i ih IDX ENC file Q      , 'i i iY L  , 
' '( || || || )i i i i sSK h L T  ,  ||i i iH h x F SK  , ||i x i i iE ENC X F SK     and  
  '|| || || || || || || ||i i i i s i i x i iD h ID T SK h x F ENC X F     . AS then sends the message 
2 , , , ,i i i s iMSG E D Y T H  to Ui. 
4) After receiving 2MSG  at timestamp Tj, Ui checks condition  j sT T T   . If invalid Ui terminates the 
session; otherwise Ui computes 
'
i i iL Y   , 
' '( || || || )i i i i sSK h L T  ,  
' '|| i i ih x F H SK      and  
' '||x i i i iEnc X F E SK       . Then Ui checks     ''' '|| || || || || ( || ) || ||i i i i s i i x i iD h ID T SK h x F Enc X F      . If the 
equality fails then Ui terminates the session; otherwise Ui selects a suitable file name Fname for the file 
and stores the encrypted file as   ( )|||| , , , ix i i i name n r bitsh x F
Enc X F F F Enc File      
 into the memory of the 
USB MSD, where (n-r) bits are the remaining bits of the file. Note that if Ui maintains a database for 
 the file plus key combinations then Ui has to also communicate with AS to extract the first r bits of the 
file. If r or (n-r) bits are larger than key size k then Ui breaks r or (n-r) bits into blocks of size equal to 
the key size k (here 128 bits) and encrypt each block with the counter (CTR) mode [10] of operation to 
produce the corresponding ciphertext. Plaintext can be retrieved by the same procedure reversely. 
 
When Ui wants to decrypt that encrypted file from the USB MSD in the current session, the following steps 
are executed between Ui and AS: 
 
5) Ui sends message ' || , , ,
i
d
x i i i i iSK
Enc Enc X F F ID T       to AS, where 
d
iT  is the current timestamp.  
6) After receiving the message at timestamp 
d
sT , AS checks the format of IDi and  d ds iT T T   . If either 
is invalid AS rejects the message; otherwise AS computes 
  '' '|| ||i ii i x SK x i iSKX F Dec Dec Enc Enc X F
           
  and checks '
ii FF  . If equal AS sends 
  ' , || ,
i
d
SK i i i i sEnc X H h x F SK T
   
 
 to Ui. 
7) After receiving   ' , || ,
i
d
SK i i i i sEnc X H h x F SK T
   
 
 at timestamp 
d
jT , Ui checks  d ds jT T T   . 
If false Ui rejects the message, otherwise Ui obtains the plaintext of the file by decoding file by 
computing 
 
   
'||
( )|| ||
_
||
ii i i
i i
SK ih ID SK
n r bitsh x F h x F
Dec Dec Enc X
Dec File
Dec Enc File


           
   
     
 
 
C. Authentication with File Decryption Phase in a Different Session 
 
When Ui wants to decrypt the stored encrypted file from the USB MSD in a different session, the following 
steps are executed between Ui and AS:  
 
1) After checking the provided password pwi, identity IDi and biometric parameter
'
iB  of Ui as described 
in IV.B, the USB MSD generates random number i  and then computes 
ˆ ˆ( || || || || )i i i i i iW h L ID F T ,  
ˆ
i i iZ L    and 
ˆ ||i x i i iQ ENC X F     , where iF  and 
ˆ
iT  are the indexes of the file and the current 
timestamp of Ui respectively. Message ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ3 , , , , ,i i i i i iMSG ID F Q Z W T  is sent to AS. 
2) After receiving 3MSG  at timestamp ˆsT , AS checks the format of IDi and  ˆ ˆs iT T T   . If either are 
invalid AS rejects 3MSG ; otherwise AS computes  ' ||i iL h ID x  and 
' ' ˆ
i i iL Z   . Then AS checks 
 ' 'ˆ ˆ|| || || ||i i i i i iW h L ID F T . If the equality fails AS rejects 3MSG ; otherwise AS generates a random 
number i  and computes  ' ' 'ˆ||i i x i iX F DEC Q L    . Then AS checks 
'
i iF F . If true, AS further 
computes 'ˆi i iY L  ,  ' 'ˆ ˆ|| || ||i i i i sSK h L T  ,   ˆ||i i iH h x F SK  , 'ˆ ˆi i iE X SK   and 
  ' 'ˆ ˆ ˆ|| || || || || || ||i i i i s i i iD h ID T SK h x F X  . AS then sends message ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ4 , , , ,i i i i sMSG E D Y H T  to Ui. 
3) After receiving 4MSG  at timestamp 
jTˆ , Ui checks  ˆ ˆj sT T T   . If false, Ui rejects message 4MSG ; 
otherwise Ui computes 
' ˆ
i i iY L   ,  ' 'ˆ ˆ|| || ||i i i i sSK h L T  ,   ' 'ˆ|| i i ih x F H SK     , ' 'ˆ ˆ ˆi i iX E SK   and 
checks equality  '' ' 'ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ|| || || || || ( || ) ||i i i i s i i iD h ID T SK h x F X     . If it fails Ui rejects message 4MSG ; 
 otherwise Ui decrypts 
'ˆ
iX   by using the key  ||i ih ID   to recover the plaintext of the file as 
 
'
||
ˆ
i ir bits ih ID
File DEC X
 
 
 and also decrypts ( || ) ( )ih x F n r bitsENC File 
 
 
 by using the key  
'
|| ih x F    
as        || ||i in r bits n r bitsh x F h x F
File Dec Enc File 
  
    
, where  ( )||r bits n r bitsFile File File  . 
 
D. Password Update Phase 
 
When a user Ui wants to change their password, the password update phase is invoked. 
 
1) Ui inserts their USB MSD into the client USB port and inputs their current password pwi, identity IDi, 
biometric parameter 'iB  and their new password 
[ ]new
ipw . The USB MSD computes 
 ||i i i iB G h ID pw   and checks  ',i ides B B d . If it fails the MSD rejects Ui; otherwise the device 
computes  ||i i i iK h ID pw   ,  ,i i iRep B   and     || ||i i i i iL h ID x A h pw    . Then it checks 
  || ||i i i iC h L h pw  . If the equality fails then the device rejects Ui; otherwise the USB MSD executes 
the next step. 
2) Then the USB MSD computes  [ ] [ ] ||new newi ii iA L h pw   ,   [ ] [ ]|| ||new newi ii iC h L h pw  , 
 [ ] [ ]||new newi ii iG B h ID pw    and  [ ] [ ]||new newi ii iK h ID pw  . The MSD then replaces , , ,i i i iA C G K  
with [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ], , ,new new new newi i i iA C G K  respectively. 
 
 
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED SCHEME 
 
The formal security analysis of the proposed scheme under the random oracle model is presented in this 
section. This security analysis uses the formal security analysis under the generic group model of 
cryptography. In the following, this work defines random oracles for the formal security analysis of the 
proposed scheme: 
 
 OracleH is a random oracle which maintains a tuple ,y m  such that  y h m . It returns m from y upon 
receiving a query  ,qH y  if ,y m  is present in the tuple; otherwise returns a random number 1r . Then 
it stores a new entry 1,y r  into its tuple. 
 OracleFE is a random oracle which contains two parts: 
1. OracleFEGEN unconditionally outputs the pair (ψ,θ) from the corresponding tuple , ,b    upon 
receiving a query (qGEN,b) such that    , GEN b    if , ,b    is present in its tuple; otherwise 
returns two random numbers 2r  and 3r . Then it stores new entry 2 3, ,b r r  into its tuple.  
2. OracleFEREP unconditionally outputs ψ from the corresponding tuple ' , ,b    upon receiving a 
query (qREP,b’,θ) such that  ' ,REP b   if ' , ,b    is present in its tuple; otherwise returns 
random number 4r . Then it stores new entry 
'
4, ,b r  into its tuple. 
 
 
 
 
  OracleSK is a random oracle which contains two parts: 
1. OracleSKENC unconditionally outputs the ciphertext C from its tuple ,M C  upon receiving a query 
(qENC,M) such that  kC ENC M  if ,M C  is present in its tuple; otherwise returns random 
number 5r  from the ciphertext space. It then stores a new entry 5,M r  in its tuple. 
2. OracleSKDEC unconditionally outputs a key k and plaintext M from its tuple , ,C k M  upon 
receiving a query (qDEC,C) such that  kM CENC  if , ,C k M  is present in its tuple; otherwise 
returns two random numbers 6r  and 7r  from key space. Then it stores new entry 6 7, ,C r r  in its 
tuple. 
 
 
Theorem 1: Under the assumption that  h   and ENC/DEC act as random oracles, the proposed scheme 
derived from this Three-factor Security Protocol (TSP) work is then provably secure against an adversary A 
for deriving the secret key x of an authentication server AS after obtaining the stored information into the 
memory of the MSD, and capturing the login message and the reply messages of the authentication plus file 
encryption plus file retrieval phase during communication between  Ui and AS in the current session as well 
as in a different session. 
 
Proof 1: Assume that A has the ability to derive the secret key x of AS, and the MSD of  Ui is lost or stolen. 
Thus, A can extract the stored parameters , , ,i i i iA C K G  from the memory of the MSD of iU  by power 
monitoring [11], [12]. A also traps the login message MSG1, the reply messages MSG2, 
   diiiiixSK TIDFFXEncEnc i ,,,||'
 and   dsiSK TXEnc i ,
'  of the authentication plus data retrieval phase at timestamp 
iT , sT , 
d
iT  and 
d
sT  respectively. A runs the algorithm derived from this work (TSP), 
,
1
A TSP
OracleEXP   to derive 
the secret key x of AS as given in Algorithm 1. Define the success probability of 
,
1
A TSP
OracleEXP  as: 
 
, ,
Pr 11 1
A TSP A TSP
Oracle OracleSucc EXP  
  
                               (4) 
 
then the advantage is given by: 
 
   
, ,
1 1, , max
A TSP A TSP
Oracle Oracle
At qH qDEd SuccCA v                             (5) 
 
where the maximum is taken over all A with the execution time t, the number of queries qH made to the 
OracleH oracle and the number of queries qDEC made by OracleSKDEC. 
 
The proposed scheme is said to be provably secure against A deriving the secret key x of AS if 
 
,
, ,1
A TSP
OracleAd t qH qDv EC  , for any small 0  . According to 
,
1
A TSP
OracleEXP , if A is successful in computing the 
inversion of  h   as well as extracting the correct secret key, then A can successfully derive the secret key 
x  of AS by using the OracleH  and OracleSKDEC random oracles respectively. But, according to Definition 
1 and 3,  
, 1
, ,1
A TSP
Oracle t qH qA v DECd  , for any small 01  . Since the advantage  
,
, ,1
A TSP
OracleAd t qH qDv EC  , for 
any small 0   because the proposed scheme depends on  1HAAdv t  and  1
DEC
AAdv t . Thus, this proposed 
scheme is secure against A for deriving the secret key x of S. 
 
 Algorithm 1 Oracle
TSPAEXP ,1  
 '
'
: , , , , , , , , , , , , || ,
: 0 1
i
i
i i i i i i i i i i i s x i iSK
SK i
Input A C ID F W Z T E Y H D T Enc Enc X F
Enc X
Output or
  
  
 
1: Calls OracleH  on the input Ci to retrieve the information h(IDi || x) 
and pwri (= h(pwi || ψi)) as ( *[ ( || )]ih ID x ||
*
ipwr  ) ← OracleH (Ci) 
2: Computes **[ ( || )]ih ID x = 
*
i iA pwr  
3: Calls OracleH on the input Wi to retrieve the information 
( ( || ))i iL h ID x ,  IDi, αi, Fi and Ti as (
*
iL ||
*
iID ||
*
i  || 
*
iF || 
*
iT ) ←  
OracleH (Wi) 
4: Calls OracleH on the input Di to retrieve the information IDi, βi, αi, Ts, 
SKi , h(x || Fi) and Encx[Xi || Fi] as ( **iID ||
*
i ||
**
i  || 
*
sT || 
*
iSK || 
*[ ( || )]ih x F  || 
*[ [ || ]]x i iEnc X F ) ←  OracleH (Di) 
5: Calls OracleSKDEC on the input [ [ || ]]
iSK x i i
Enc Enc X F  to retrieve 
the information SKi and Encx[Xi || Fi] as ( ** **,[ [ || ]]i x i iSK Enc X F ) ← 
OracleSKDEC ( [ [ || ]]
iSK x i i
Enc Enc X F ) 
6: Calls OracleSKDEC on the input **[ [ || ]]x i iEnc X F  to retrieve the 
information x and (Xi || Fi) as ( * * **, ( || )i ix X F ) ← OracleSKDEC(
**[ [ || ]]x i iEnc X F
) 
7: Calls OracleSKDEC on the input [ ]
iSK i
Enc X  to retrieve the 
information SKi and Xi as ( *** **,i iSK X )←OracleSKDEC( [ ]iSK iEnc X
) 
8: if ( *
i iT T ) && (
*
s sT T ) && (
* **
i i  ) && 
** *( )i i iID ID ID   && 
* **( )i i iF F F   && 
* ** ***( )i i iSK SK SK   && 
* **( )i iX X  then 
9:         Computes ** *
i i iL Z   ,  
*** *[ [ || ]]x i i i iEnc X F E SK  , 
*** *
i iL Y    and 
** *[ ( || )]i i ih x F H SK   
7. else 
8:         Return 0 (failure) 
9: if * **([ ( || )] [ ( || )] )i ih x F h x F &&
*** * **([ [ || ]] [ [ || ]] [ [ || ]] )x i i x i i x i iEnc X F Enc X F Enc X F   
then 
10:       Calls OracleH  on the input *[ ( || )]ih x F  to retrieve the 
information 
iF  and x  as (
** ***|| ix F ) ← OracleH (
*[ ( || )]ih x F ) 
11:       Calls OracleSKDEC on the input *[ [ || ]]x i iEnc X F  to retrieve the 
information 
iX , iF  and x  as (x
***, *** ****( || )i iX F ) ← 
OracleSKDEC *[ [ || ]]x i iEnc X F ) 
12: else 
13:        Return 0 (failure) 
14: if * ** *** * **( [ ( || )] [ ( || )] )i i i i iL L L h ID x h ID x     then 
15:       Calls OracleH  on the input *
iL to retrieve the information iID  and 
x  as ( *** ****||iID x ) ← OracleH (
*
iL ) 
16: else 
17:        Return 0 (failure) 
18: if ***( )i iID ID  && 
*** ****( )i i iF F F   && 
* ***( )i iX X  && 
* ** *** ****( )x x x x    then 
19:        Return 1 (success) 
20: else 
21:        Return 0 (failure) 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Theorem 2: Under the assumption that  h   and FE act as  random oracles, the proposed Three-factor 
Security Protocol (TSP) scheme derived from this work is provably secure against adversary A for deriving 
the password ipw  of  Ui after obtaining the stored information in the MSD, and capturing the login message 
and reply message of the authentication plus file encryption plus file retrieval phase during communication 
between  Ui and AS in the current session as well as in any other session. 
 
Proof 2: Apply the same assumptions as described in Theorem 1. There is no chance to derive password pwi 
of Ui from communication messages because they are independent of the password. Then A runs the 
algorithm derived from this work (TSP), 
,
2
A TSP
OracleEXP  to derive the password 
ipw  of Ui as given in Algorithm 
2. Define the success probability of 
,
2
A TSP
OracleEXP  as: 
 
, ,
Pr 12 2
A TSP A TSP
Oracle OracleSucc EXP  
  
                              (6) 
 
then the advantage is given by: 
 
   
, ,
, , m 2x2 a
A TSP A TSP
Oracle Oracle
At qH qFEAdv Succ                            (7) 
 
where the maximum is taken over all A with the execution time t, the number of queries qH made to the 
OracleH oracle and the number of queries qFE made by OracleFEREP. Again, the proposed scheme is said to 
be provably secure against A deriving the password pwi of Ui if  
,
, ,2
A TSP
Oracle t qHAdv qFE  , for any small 0 
. According to 
,
2
A TSP
OracleEXP , if A is successful in computing the inversion of  h   as well as extract the correct 
derived biometric parameter i , they can successfully derive the password pwi of Ui by using of the OracleH  
and OracleFEREP random oracles respectively. But, according to Definition 1 and 2,  
, 1
, ,2
A TSP
Oracle t qH qA v FEd 
, for any small 01  . Since, the advantage  
,
, ,2
A TSP
Oracle t qHAdv qFE  , for any small 0   because the 
proposed scheme depends on  2HAAdv t  and  1
FE
AAdv t . Thus, this proposed scheme is secure against A for 
deriving the password 
ipw  of Ui. 
 
 
 Algorithm 2 
,2
Oracle
A TSPEXP  
: , , , ,
: 0 1
i i i i iInput K G A C ID
Output or
 
1: Calls OracleH  on the input Ci to retrieve the information h(IDi || x) 
and pwri (= h(pwi || ψi)) as ( *[ ( || )]ih ID x ||
*
ipwr  ) ← OracleH (Ci) 
2: Computes ** *[ ( || )]i i ipwr A h ID x   
3: Repeat 
4:         Chooses a password *
ipw  
5:         Computes * *( || )i i i iB G h ID pw   and 
* *( || )i i i iK h ID pw    
6:         Calls OracleFEREP on the input * *( , )i iB   to retrieve the  
information 
i  as (
*
i ) ← OracleFEREP 
* *( , )i iB   
7:          Computes *** * *( || )i i ipwr h pw   
8: Until *** **( )i ipwr pwr   
9: if *** **( )i ipwr pwr   then 
10:         Accepts *
ipw  as correctly guessed password 
11:         Return 1 (success)  
12: else 
13:         Return 0 (failure) 
  
 
 
Theorem 3: Under the assumption that  h   and ENC/DEC act as random oracles, then the Three-factor 
Security Protocol (TSP) scheme derived from this work is provably secure against A deriving the shared 
secret session key SK between Ui and AS after getting the stored information into the memory of the MSD 
device, and trapping the login message and reply message of authentication plus file encryption plus file 
retrieval phase during communication between Ui and AS in the current session as well as any other session. 
 
Proof 3: Apply the same assumptions as described in Theorem 1. Then A runs the algorithm derived from 
this work (TSP), 
,3
Oracle
A TSPEXP   to derive the session key iSK  between Ui and AS as given in Algorithm 3. 
Define the success probability of 
,3
Oracle
A TSPEXP  as:  
 
, ,3 Pr 3 1
Oracle Oracle
A TSP A TSPSucc EXP   
                               (8) 
 
then the advantage is given by: 
 
   , ,3 , , max 3Oracle OracleA TSP A A TSPAdv t qH qDEC Succ                         (9) 
 
where the maximum is taken over all A with the execution time t, the number of queries qH made to the 
OracleH oracle and the number of queries qDEC made by OracleSKDEC. Again, the proposed scheme is said 
to be provably secure against A deriving the session key SKi between Ui and AS if ,3 ( , , )
Oracle
A TSPAdv t qH qDEC 
, for any small 0  . According to 
,3
Oracle
A TSPEXP , if A is successful in computing the inversion of  h   and 
extracting the correct key, they can successfully derive the shared secret session key 
iSK  between Ui and AS 
by using of the OracleH  and OracleSKDEC random oracles respectively. But, according to Definition 1 and 
3, 
, 13 ( , , )
Oracle
A TSPAdv t qH qDEC  , for any small 01  . Since, the advantage ,3 ( , , )
Oracle
A TSPAdv t qH qDEC  , for any 
small 0   because the proposed scheme depends on  3HAAdv t  and  3
DEC
AAdv t . Thus, the proposed 
scheme is secure against A deriving the shared secret session key 
iSK  between Ui and AS. 
 
 
 
 Algorithm 3 
,3
Oracle
A TSPEXP  
 '
'
: , , , , , , , , , , , , || ,
: 0 1
i
i
i i i i i i i i i i i s x i iSK
SK i
Input A C ID F W Z T E Y H D T Enc Enc X F
Enc X
Output or
  
  
1: Calls OracleH  on the input Ci to retrieve the information h(IDi || x) 
and pwri (= h(pwi || ψi)) as ( *[ ( || )]ih ID x ||
*
ipwr  ) ← OracleH (Ci) 
2: Computes **[ ( || )]ih ID x = 
*
i iA pwr  
3: Calls OracleH on the input Wi to retrieve the information ( ( || ))i iL h ID x ,  
IDi, αi, Fi and Ti as ( *iL ||
*
iID ||
*
i  || 
*
iF || 
*
iT ) ←  OracleH (Wi) 
4: Calls OracleH on the input Di to retrieve the information IDi, βi, αi, 
Ts, SKi , h(x || Fi) and Encx[Xi || Fi] as ( **iID ||
*
i ||
**
i  || 
*
sT || 
*
iSK || 
*[ ( || )]ih x F  || 
*[ [ || ]]x i iEnc X F ) ←  OracleH (Di) 
5: Calls OracleSKDEC on the input [ [ || ]]
iSK x i i
Enc Enc X F  to retrieve 
the information SKi and Encx[Xi || Fi] as ( ** **,[ [ || ]]i x i iSK Enc X F ) ← 
OracleSKDEC ( [ [ || ]]
iSK x i i
Enc Enc X F ) 
6: Calls OracleSKDEC on the input [ ]
iSK i
Enc X  to retrieve the 
information SKi and Xi as ( *** **,i iSK X ) ← OracleSKDEC( [ ]
iSK i
Enc X ) 
7: if ( *
i iT T ) && (
*
s sT T ) && (
* **
i i  ) && 
** *( )i i iID ID ID   
&& *( )i iF F  && 
* **([ [ || ]] [ [ || ]] )x i i x i iEnc X F Enc X F  then 
8:         Computes ** *
i i iL Z   ,  
**** *[ [ || ]]i i x i iSK E Enc X F  , 
*** *
i iL Y    and 
***** *[ ( || )]i i iSK H h x F   
9. else 
10:         Return 0 (failure) 
11: if * ** *** * **( [ ( || )] [ ( || )] )i i i i iL L L h ID x h ID x     then 
12:       Computes ****** * * *( || || || )i i i i sSK h L T   
13: else 
14:        Return 0 (failure) 
15: if  * ** *** **** ***** ******( )i i i i i iSK SK SK SK SK SK      then 
16:        Return 1 (success) 
17: else 
18:        Return 0 (failure) 
 
  
 
A. Discussion of Presented Theorems 
 
Theorem 2 demonstrated that the proposed scheme is secure against the off-line password guessing attack. 
 
Theorem 3 demonstrates that the proposed scheme is secure against the session key recovery attack, because 
without knowing random numbers α, β (for current session), and δ, γ (for a different session) then A cannot 
compute the session key SK. In the proposed scheme, all communicating messages depend on random 
numbers and the timestamp. So, all the communication messages are guaranteed to be different for every 
session. Thus, A cannot mount a replay attack on this proposed scheme. 
 
In this proposed scheme, A cannot mount a forgery attack without knowing secret password ipw  of Ui, the 
secret key x of the server AS and random numbers generated by  Ui and AS respectively. 
 
Theorems 1 and 2 show that the secret information of the authentication server and the user are secure from 
A. Thus, it is infeasible to mount a forgery attack on this proposed scheme.  
 
 
 
 
 VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF PROPOSED SCHEME 
 
This section compares the performance of the proposed scheme with related schemes in the literature [1]-
[3], [5], [6]. The login and authentication phases for both file encryption and file decryption of the proposed 
scheme have been compared with the related existing schemes in the literature [1]-[3], [5], [6] because these 
phases are commonly used.  
 
Table II presents the communication (overhead) and storage costs of this work compared to the literature. It 
can be seen that the communication cost of this work is the same for data encryption in the literature, but has 
a significant advantage in the data decryption within the current session as was the objective of this work. 
The storage cost of this work is also comparable to the literature. 
 
 
TABLE II 
COMPARISON OF COMMUNICATION AND STORAGE COSTS OF SCHEMES IN THE CURRENT LITERATURE COMPARED 
TO THIS PROPOSED SCHEME 
Comparison Metric 
Communication Cost (bits) 
Storage 
Cost (bits) 
                 File encryption Authentication + File retrieval 
Login  Authentication 
   (Different session)     (Current session) 
Login + Authentication Login + Authentication 
Ku and Chen [1] 320 256 - - 384 
Yoon, Ryu and Yoo [2] 320 256 - - 512 
Yang, Wu and Chiu [3] 3328 1280 4608 = (3328 + 1280) 4608 = (3328 + 1280) 2176 
Lee et al. [5] 512 512 1024 = (512 + 512) 1024 = (512 + 512) 384 
He et al.[6] 512 640 1152 = (512 + 640) 1152 = (512 + 640) 384 
Proposed scheme 640 768 1408 = (640 + 768) 768 = (384 + 384) 640 
 
 
 
 
Table III verifies the types of attacks that are considered, the key management and the mutual authentication 
that the literature uses compared to this work. 
 
TABLE III 
COMPARISON OF ATTACK VULNERABILITY OF SCHEMES IN THE CURRENT LITERATURE 
COMPARED TO THIS PROPOSED SCHEME 
Attack Vulnerability / Feature 
Ku and Chen 
[1] 
Yoon, Ryu 
and Yoo [2] 
Yang, Wu and 
Chiu [3] 
Lee et al. 
[5] 
He et al. 
[6] 
Proposed 
scheme 
User impersonation attack yes [2] [14] yes [14] no no no no 
Server masquerading attack yes [14] yes [14] yes [15] no no no 
Insider attack no no no no no no 
Off-line password guessing attack yes [14] yes [14] no yes [6] no no 
Inefficient login phase yes [14] yes [14] yes no no no 
Denial of service (DoS ) attack yes [14] yes [14] no yes [6] no no 
Password change phase attack yes [2] [14] yes [14] no - - no 
Replay attack no no yes yes [6] yes no 
Session key agreement no no yes yes yes yes 
Mutual authentication no no yes no yes yes 
 
 
 
 
Table IV presents the computational cost of this work compared to the literature. hT  is the time required for 
the hashing operation, PmT  for point multiplication operation, mT  for scalar multiplication operation, divT  
for division operation  and /En DeT T  for the symmetric key encryption/decryption operation. Typically, the 
time complexity associated with these operations can be expressed as /En De h Pm m divT T T T T T     [13]. 
It can be seen that this work significantly reduces the computation cost for both data encryption and data 
retrieval as well as authentication. 
 
 It can be assumed that the identity IDi, the file index Fi and the password pwi are length of 64 bits each, 
cryptographic one-way hash function  h   and symmetric key encryption/decryption, random number and 
timestamp returns 128 bits for each block. Since the communication overhead for the login, file encryption 
and the authentication phase as well as login, file decryption and authentication in different sessions is 
   2 64 8 128 256 1408      bits, and login, file decryption and authentication in current session phase is 
   2 64 5 128 768     bits. Therefore, this work achieves a much lower communication overhead than the 
work in the literature [3], [5], [6]. Low communication overhead, low storage cost, low computational cost 
and resistance of all possible attacks indicate that the proposed scheme provides an efficient security protocol 
offering a practical solution for enhanced security of mass market USB MSD. 
 
TABLE IV 
COMPARISON OF COMPUTATIONAL COST OF RELATED SCHEMES 
COMPARED TO THIS PROPOSED SCHEME 
                  File encryption     Authentication + File retrieval 
 Login          Authentication Different session Current session 
 (USB MSD) (USB MSD) (Server) (USB MSD) (Server) (USB MSD) (Server) 
Ku and Chen [1] 2Th 1Th 3Th - - - - 
Yoon, Ryu and Yoo [2] 2Th 1Th 3Th - - - - 
Yang, Wu and Chiu [3] 1Tm+1Th 
+2Te 
2Th+2Te+ 
1TDe+1TEn 
1Ten+1Tdiv+2
Tm+3Te+3Th 
1Tm+3Th 
+4Te+2TDe 
1Ten+1Tdiv+2
Tm+3Te+3Th 
1Tm+3Th 
+4Te+2TDe 
1Ten+1Tdiv+2Tm+
3Te+3Th 
Lee et al. [5] 4Th+1TPm 2Th+1TPm+ 
1TEn+1TDe 
4Th+2TPm 
+1TEn 
6Th+2TPm 
+2TDe 
4Th+2TPm 
+1TEn 
6Th+2TPm 
+2TDe 
4Th+2TPm 
+1TEn 
He et al. [6] 4Th+1TPm 3Th+1TPm+ 
1TEn+1TDe 
5Th+2TPm 
+1TEn 
7Th+2TPm 
+2TDe 
5Th+2TPm 
+1TEn 
7Th+2TPm 
+2TDe 
5Th+2TPm 
+1TEn 
Proposed scheme 5Th+1TEn 2Th 4Th+1TEn 7Th+1TDe 4Th+1TDe 1TEn+2TDe 2TDe+1TEn 
 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
An efficient mutual authentication protocol has been presented to encrypt files in a Universal Serial Bus 
(USB) Mass Storage Device (MSD) enabling secure and usable “USB memory sticks.” This paper has 
contributed a novel concept to the current state of the art in biometric security algorithms by defending 
against security attacks and improving device usability across different sessions. Moreover, the paper has 
formally proved that the proposed protocol can withstand relevant security weaknesses. A performance 
comparison has also been made with the literature to confirm that the proposed scheme achieves a 
significantly lower computation cost and communication cost than other related schemes. The overall 
efficiency demonstrates that USB based MSDs with biometric security sensors can be implemented in order 
to provide significant security and usability for the consumer and beyond. 
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